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This paper analyses the consequences for growth during the transitional period of 
considering the learning-by-doing process proposed by Arrow (1962) as internal, instead of 
as an externality. To do this, it develops a simple endogenous growth model with human 
capital accumulation through external and internal learning processes. The calibrated model 
delivers two features of the Japanese growth experience: slow convergence, and negative 
correlation between the growth rate of per capita GDP and investment share. The crucial 
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operates reducing diminishing returns to physical capital. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
A strand of endogenous growth theory has shown that the introduction of positive 
externalities of investment in physical capital leads to sustained growth of per capita 
output (Sheshinski (1967); Romer (1986); Lucas (1988)). These models are based on 
Arrow’s (1962) idea that knowledge and productivity gains come from investment in 
physical capital. More specifically, an increase in a firm’s capital stock leads to a 
parallel increase in its stock of knowledge that incorporates to workers through an 
external learning process, or learning-by-doing (LBD) process.   
Since firms decide physical investment and human capital is embodied in workers, 
this learning process has been traditionally considered as an externality. Moreover, a 
 
* We are grateful to Fernando Perera, Jordi Caballé, seminar participants at CREB, participants in Annual 
Meeting of the SED 2001 and Annual Congress of the EEA 2001, and an anonymous referee for their 
comments. We also acknowledge financial support from Generalitat de Catalunya (2001 SGR-29) and 
Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología (SEC 2003-06630 and SEC 2003-06080). The usual disclaimer applies. 
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usual assumption is that workers’ skills generated result in general human capital that is 
portable across jobs. Concepts of general and specific human capital are due to Becker 
(1975). Skills are general when a big part of them are portable across jobs, and 
firm-specific when a big part of them are useful only in the firm where they were 
generated. Nonetheless, the empirical study by Bessen (1998) reveals that LBD is 
largely a firm-specific human capital investment. He also finds that many plants invest 
in LBD as much as in physical capital, which means that this investment is 
quantitatively relevant. 
Based on these empirical results, it seems reasonable to consider LBD investment as 
intentional or internal. To this respect, Álvarez Albelo (1999) shows that internal LBD 
extremely affects the length of the transitional period. More concretely, she finds that the 
introduction of internal LBD in a two-sector model of endogenous growth permits to 
reconcile the convergence speed delivered by the model with the 2% reported by 
empirical studies (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992); Mankiw et al. (1992)). However, 
she leaves aside the special features of specific human capital, and solves the planner 
problem.  
Our aim in this paper is to analyse the effects of internal LBD on growth along the 
transitional period. To do this, we develop a simple model of endogenous growth with 
firm-specific and general human capital accumulation through internal and external 
learning processes, respectively. Differently from Álvarez-Albelo (1999), our results are 
based on a decentralised equilibrium. The predictions from our model confirm that 
internal LBD enlarges the transitional period of the economy. We also find that it 
extremely affects the time evolution of investment share of output (saving rate). 
Our theoretical framework builds on Arrow’s (1962). There are two types of 
homogenous agents in the economy: firms and households. Firms produce an aggregate 
good, hire labour and make decisions on investment in physical capital and specific 
human capital of their workers. The same amount of current investment results in higher 
levels of both physical and human capital in the next period and, hence, there exists 
complementarities between these two types of capital. Households work, consume and 
save. The human capital embodied in the worker is composed of general and 
firm-specific skills. General human capital is accumulated through an external learning 
process, in which total efficient time is the relevant variable. 
Since in the model the firm carries out the investment, and specific skills are 
embodied in the worker, the wage per time unit must be higher than the competitive one 
to avoid that the employee quits the firm. This means that both parts must achieve an 
agreement to share the returns to investment. By simplicity, we do not explicitly 
formalise that agreement, and assume that the returns are split according to an 
exogenous and fixed parameter that determines the bargaining power of the parts. 
Our analysis is mainly numerical and involves two steps. First, we calibrate the 
model to replicate some long-run observations of the American economy, and a measure 
of labour remuneration constructed from Japanese data. Then, we compute the model 
using the parameter values calibrated. In the computation, we assume that the initial INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  3
ratio of physical to human capital is lower than its long-run value. 
The main feature of internal LBD is that it reduces the diminishing return to physical 
capital accumulation. This is a consequence of the double role played by physical 
investment. Thus, the interest rate is higher than the usual net marginal productivity of 
physical capital, and its equation includes both capital and labour marginal productivities. 
As physical capital accumulates, the marginal productivity of physical capital falls, while 
the marginal productivity of labour raises, which prevents interest rate from declining to 
fast. This mechanism acts slowing the convergence of the economy towards its long-run 
equilibrium, and strengthening the incentives to save (invest). 
The time paths obtained from the computation of the model illustrate the effects of 
internal LBD on the transitional behaviour of the economy. The most striking result refers 
to the upward sloping time path of saving rate. The time evolution of the saving rate is 
driving by the offsetting impacts of a substitution effect and an income effect. The first one 
relies on diminishing returns, and generates incentives to reduce the saving rate along time. 
The income effect is related to the gap between current and permanent income and the 
willingness to smooth consumption over time, and generates the opposite incentives. Since 
internal LBD reduces diminishing returns, the second effect imposes to the first one, and 
the saving rate rises during the transitional period. The growth rate of output, however, 
strictly decreases as a consequence of diminishing returns. 
The predictions from our model are consistent with the empirical evidence by Jones 
(1995). This author points out that AK type of models predict a direct relationship 
between per capita GDP growth and investment share, while the data that he considers 
show that, for some countries, the growth variable decreases while investment share 
increases over time. This is especially true for Japan. Unlike other countries, investment 
share and the growth rate of Japan exhibit a notably high negative correlation. Several 
empirical findings suggest that the hypothesis of internal LBD could be a good 
explanation for the behaviour of the Japanese economy. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents and comments some 
empirical facts regarding investment share and growth. Section 3 describes the 
theoretical framework. Section 4 characterises the equilibrium of the economy. Section 5 
contains the calibration and the computation of the model. Section 5 summarizes and 




2.    THE EMPIRICAL FACTS REGARDING INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 
 
The empirical evidence by Jones (1995) shows that total investment shares have 
increased by several percentage points for a number of developed countries during the 
post World War II era, while per capita GDP growth rates have fallen. Here, we present 
some evidence on this empirical fact. We look at data in a very simple way, by 
correlating real per capita GDP growth rate and real investment share of GDP. We CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  4
consider data from six European countries and Japan since 1950, after World War II, 
until 2000.
1 These economies lost an important part of their physical capital during 
World War II, and during Civil War in the case of Spain. Hence, we can ensure that they 




Table 1.    Correlations between Per Capita GDP Growth Rate (1951-2000) and 
Investment Share of GDP (1950-1999) 
Country  Actual Data  Smoothed Data
 
Austria -0.4161  -0.4736 
France -0.1230  -0.1949 
Great Britain  -0.1729  -0.1759 
Italy 0.3116  0.8405 
Spain -0.1879  -0.4992 
Japan -0.4349  -0.6616 
West Germany  0.0971  0.5007 
Notes: Data for West Germany correspond to the period 1950-1992. Data have been smoothed using the HP 
filter. (smoothing parameter=400) 
Source: PWT Mark 6.1 and 5.6. 
 
 
We find that correlation coefficients calculated with both actual and smoothed data 
are negative for all considered economies, except for Italy and West Germany. 
Moreover, correlations (in absolute value) increase when business cycle effects are 
removed, and especially for Spain and Japan. 
The negative correlations seem to be related to the facts that time paths of both 
variables are hump shaped, and increases in growth significantly precede increases in 
investment share. Contrary to the traditional view that investment causes growth, these 
observations suggest that the causality runs in the opposite direction. Several empirical 
studies support this hypothesis (e.g., Edwards (1995); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995); 
Loayza et al. (2000)), but there exists also evidence of a two-ways causality (Madsen 
(2002)).
2
These empirical findings are problematic for neoclassical growth models and also for 
AK type of models, in which the feedback from growth to saving is absent. To this 
respect, Carroll et al. (2000) showed that the introduction of internal habit formation in 
 
1 We use variables KI and GRGDPL in the PWT Mark 5.6a and 6.1.   
2 More concretely, growth is caused by investment in machinery and equipment, whereas investment in 
structures and non-residential buildings is caused by growth. INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  5
the AK model permits to reconcile the predictions from the model with the data.
3 
Nevertheless, growth-to-saving causality might be not all that counts for understanding 
the negative correlations in Table 1, and specially the high one of the Japanese economy. 
As shown in Figure 1, the Japanese growth rate presents a trend to decreasing (Fig. 1b). 
However, it is difficult to infer from the data the future evolution of investment share 
(Fig. 1a). What is clear is that it rapidly rose until the early 1970s, and has being 











Fig.1d. Growth Rates of Inv. p/w and BE 
Inv. p/w 1966-1998 
BE  1968-2000    
Fig.1c. Bonus-Earnings Ratio (BE)






Fig.1a. Investment Share of GDP
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Notes: BE in Figure 1c refers to the ratio of special earnings to total earnings. Inv. p/w in Figure 1d refers to 
real investment per worker. All variables are in percentage form.   
Sources: PWT Mark 6.1 and Historical Statistics of Japan. 
 
Figure 1.    Japanese Growth Experience 
 
 
3 Their analysis considers saving rate instead of investment share of output. Nevertheless, the data reveal that 
there is a powerful relationship between both variables. CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  6
One could wonder why the Japanese economy has been investing such a big part of 
its GDP, while investment shares of other countries have been falling. Here, we propose 
that the answer lies on the existence of investment in firm-specific human capital 
through internal or intentional LBD. As we will show later on, internal LBD prevents 
the return to physical investment (savings) from declining too fast, which generates 
incentives to postpone today consumption for a longer period than with an external LBD 
process. Under internal learning, investment leads to growth, and the growth rate 
declines through time as a consequence of decreasing returns to physical capital. 
The peculiar features of the Japanese labour market, also called nenko system,
4 are 
consistent with the existence of investment in firm-specific skills. Indeed, two pervasive 
characteristics of this system are lifetime employment (Hashimoto and Raisian (1985))
5 
and flexible wages in the form of variable bonus payments, which add to base wages 
(Fig. 1c). The theoretical and empirical analysis by Hashimoto (1979) reveals that these 
features are associated to a high profitability of investment in firm-specific human 
capital, and the low transaction costs facing the worker and the employer in evaluating 
fluctuations in productivity. Thus, the bonus would reflect the part of returns to 
investment that corresponds to the worker. 
The next question to be clarified is whether a fraction of this investment takes the 
form of LBD. The empirical evidence provided by Bessen (1998) strongly supports this 
hypothesis. He also finds that this investment is quantitatively relevant; many plants 
invest in LBD as much as in physical capital and more than they invest in formal 
on-the-job-training. Though Bessen uses American plant-level data, we do not find any 
reason to think that his results cannot be extrapolated to the Japanese economy. 
To achieve some intuition regarding the relationship between physical investment 
and bonus payments in Japan, we plot the growth rates of per worker investment and the 
bonus-earnings ratio (Fig. 1d). Considering that LBD is related to new capital goods 
introduced in the production process (e.g., Dunne et al. (2000)), one would expect a 
strong investment-to-bonus causality. The data suggest the existence of this causal 
channel. More concretely, the growth rate of bonus-earnings ratio mimics fairly well the 
two-lagged growth rate of investment per worker. 
In light of these empirical findings, internal LBD can be considered as plausible 
explanation for the negative correlation between investment share and the growth rate. 
However, internal LBD must not be viewed as a competitor for the theory of habit 
formation, but as another factor that may coexist with habit formation and that generates 
incentives to increase physical investment for a longer period.   
 
 
4 See Cole (1971, p. 134) for a characterisation of this system. 
5 Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) find that long-term employment is more prevalent and earnings-tenure 
profiles are more steeply sloped in Japan than in the United States. They argue that their results are consistent 
with there being more specific human capital in Japan than in the American economy. INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  7
3.    THE MODEL AND AGENTS’ DECISIONS 
 
This section presents the theoretical framework and outlines agents’ decisions. To 
offer a clearer exposition, we first make a sketch of the model and then describe it with 
more detail in the two next subsections. 
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Time is discrete and endless. All 
variables are expressed in per capita terms. As it is usual, we assume that agents have 
perfect foresight. There are two types of agents: firms and households. Firms produce a 
final aggregate good, which can be either accumulated as physical capital or consumed. 
Firms hire labour, and make decisions on investing in physical capital and specific human 
capital of their workers. The economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely lived 
identical households, which grows at an exogenous rate n. Each household is endowed 
with a unit of time at every period that can only be devoted to work. Households work, 
consume and save. Total human capital of households is composed of specific skills 
provided by firms through an intentional investment process (internal LBD), and general 
skills that accumulate while working through an external learning process. 
 
3.1.  Firms 
 
There is a continuum of measure one of identical firms that produce a homogenous 
good using the same Cobb-Douglas production function with constant returns to scale: 
 
,










                                                 (1) 
 
where   is the production,   denotes the stock of physical capital and   is the 
labour input. The labour input is measured in efficiency units, and results from 
multiplying working time by total human capital or skills per worker. Each worker 
possesses general and firm-specific skills,   and   respectively. 
t Y t K t H
t h , t e
We adopt Arrow (1962) technology to model the accumulation of firm-specific 
human capital. This formalization implies that knowledge and productivity gains come 
from investment in physical capital, but here this investment is intentional or internal, 
instead of an external effect. Concretely, 
 
, ) 1 ( ) 1 (
, ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 1
1
t H t t
t K t t
e I e n
K I K n
δ γ
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− + = +
− + = +
+
+                                            ( 2 )  
 
where   is gross investment in physical capital,   is a productivity parameter, 
and   and    are physical and human capital depreciation rates. 
t I 0 1 > γ
0 ≥ K δ 0 ≥ H δ
The investment decision in our model corresponds to the firm. However, to prevent CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  8
workers from quitting, it must offer a higher remuneration than competitors. Note that 
only general human capital is remunerated if workers quit. In this case, the worker 
would receive the competitive wage. Therefore, employer and employee must achieve 
an agreement to share the returns to investment in specific human capital. This 
agreement may take the form of an implicit or explicit contract. The contract is mutually 
beneficial, since it permits the firm to retain a part of the returns, while the worker 
receives a higher remuneration than in any other job.   
Equation (1) implies that general and specific skills are perfect substitute and, hence, 
have the same marginal productivity. Since the remuneration to general human capital is 
competitively determined, the marginal productivity of both types of human capital will 
be equal to the competitive wage,  .  The total return to investment in specific skills is 
 in the firm where it took place, and equals zero in any other firm. The total value 
of a worker in the firm is given by   while the value in an alternative 
employment is    Thus, the worker and the firm must agree on how to share  . 
t w
t te w
), ( t t t e h w +
. t th w t te w
By simplicity, we do not explicitly formalise any contract. Instead, we follow 
Fukuda and Owen (2004) and assume that the returns are shared according to the 
bargaining power of both parties. The bargaining power is exogenously given and 
remains constant over time.
6 Worker’s wage per time unit,   may be viewed as 
consisting of the alternative wage per time unit, plus a wage premium or bonus 
representing his share in total returns to investment in specific human capital. In addition, 
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where  η  is the firm’s sharing ratio in total returns to investment or bargaining power 
of the firm. Given that  η  lies between zero and one, the separation never takes place. 
Note that the criteria for quit is    and for dismissal is    t t
T
t h w w ≤ . 0 ≤ t te w η
Given these assumptions, the problem of the representative firm consists of 
maximising the sum of total profits discounted at the market interest rate    , t r
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6 To analyse how the parties achieve an agreement is far from the scope of this paper. Further discussions on 
this issue can be found in Hashimoto (1979, 1981) and Rosen (1985). INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  9
subject to the accumulation of physical capital and specific human capital, (2), the split 
of labour returns, (3), and the initial endowments of physical and specific human capital, 
 and    respectively. Although it is not necessary, we assume that there are 
not specific skills embodied in the worker at the initial period. The price of the aggregate 
good is taken as numerary. 
0 0 > K , 0 0 = e
This is a standard problem of dynamic optimisation, with first order conditions for 
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and equations in (2), where   and   denote shadow prices for physical and 






3.2.  Households 
 
Each household derives utility from the consumption of the aggregate good,   
and maximizes its intertemporal utility discounted at a positive rate 
, t C









































                                   (9) 
 
The households’ assets equal the market value of the firm,   At each period, 
households earn the rate of return   on assets, and receive labour income. They face 
the budget constraint: 
. t A
t rCARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  10
. ) ) 1 ( ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 t t t t t t t C e h w A r A n − − + + + = + + η                               (10) 
 
As before indicated, general skills come from an external LBD process, in which 
total efficient time embodied in the worker is the relevant variable. More specifically, 
the technology for general human capital takes the form: 
 
, ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( 0 1 t H t t t h e h h n δ γ − + + = + +                                     ( 1 1 )  
 
where   is a productivity parameter, and general and specific skills depreciate at 
the same rate. Additionally, we assume that the growth rate of general skills is always 
positive, which requires that    It seems to us reasonable that specific human 
capital contributes to produce general skills. For instance, it may be argued that once the 
worker has learned how to use a particular type of machine, it is easier for him to make 
work other type machines. In the example, the first task acts as a kind of learning that 
generates more general abilities.
0 0 > γ
. 0 0 > − H δ γ
7
The representative household maximises its total discounted utility (9), subject to the 
budget constraint (10), and given the time path of firm-specific human capital, 
  the accumulation of general human capital (11) and the initial endowment of 
this capital,    The first order conditions of this problem are: 
{} , , 2 , 1 , 0 K = t t e
. 0 0 > h
 
() , 0 ) 1 ( = − +
−
t t
tC n µ β
σ                                              ( 1 2 )  
 
, 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 1 = + + + − + + t t t r n µ µ                                          ( 1 3 )  
 
and Equation (10), where    is the shadow value of household’s assets.  t µ
 
 
4.    EQUILIBRIUM OF THE ECONOMY 
 
Markets of consumption good, assets and labour with just general skills are perfectly 
competitive. However, the wage of workers with specific skills is not competitively 
determined. In our simple model, agents are homogenous and do not face any kind of 
uncertainty or costs of agreeing. Therefore, the equilibrium implies that workers are 
hired at the initial period, and stay in the firm forever. Next, we characterised the 
equilibrium of the economy. 
Given the initial values for physical capital,   and general and specific  , 0 0 > K
 
7 Of course, this technology extremely simplifies the model, since it permits to solve it just considering total 
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human capital,   and   the split of labour returns, (3), and the technology 
to accumulate general skills, (11), the equilibrium of the economy is characterised by a 
set of allocations {  and prices 
0 0 > h , 0 0 = e
} K , 2 , 1 , 0 1 1 1 , , , = + + + t t t t t e H K C { } K , 2 , 1 , 0 , = t t t r w  such that they 
satisfy firm’s and household’s problems, and that clear all markets in the economy. In 
particular, the feasibility condition,   must  hold.  , t t t C I Y + =
Manipulating the first order conditions of firm’s and household’s problems, we can 
construct the dynamic system driving the behaviour of the economy over time. Notice 
that adding up the second equation in (2) and (11), the model can be solved just 
considering the variable    As it is standard in the literature, we first define intensive 
variables that will remain stationary along the balanced growth path (BGP), or long-run 
equilibrium. It is easy to check that along the BGP all shadow prices,   and   
must grow at the same constant rate, and   a n d     must grow at a common 
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where interest rate in equilibrium equals: 
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Equation (15) to (18), along with the initial values   and  , and the 
transversality conditions: 
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fully characterise the dynamics of the economy. 
The evolution of the bonus-earnings ratio can be obtained considering definitions in 
(14), and dividing the second equation in (2) by (11). This operation yields: 
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Internal LBD implies the existence of complementarities between physical and 
human capital, which extremely affects the evolution of interest rate, or return to savings, 
through time. More specifically, current savings (investment) have a double return: one 
from increasing physical capital and the other from improving efficiency units of labour. 
Thus, interest rate (Equation (18)) is composed of marginal productivity of physical 
capital, plus the return from increasing the marginal productivity of labour due to 
investment in human capital. The latter return is multiplied by η , reflecting that the 
firm retains that proportion of the returns to investment in specific human capital. The 
depreciation rates of physical and human capital are weighted by the shadow value of 
the respective capital over total shadow value. Lastly, notice that an additional unit of 
physical investment produces   units of specific human capital, which depreciates by 
 
1 γ
. 1 H δ γ
As we will discuss in the next section, this feature of the model is crucial in 
determining the length of the transitional period and the shape of saving rate time path. 
 
 
5.    BALANCED GROWTH PATH AND DYNAMICS: A NUMERICAL 
ANALYSIS  
 
Our purpose in this section is to illustrate through a numerical example the 
predictions of the model. This exercise will be useful to understand the implications of 
internal LBD for growth during the transition. In particular, we will show that the 
calibrated model delivers two observed features of the Japanese growth experience: slow 
convergence, and negative correlation between per capita output growth rate and saving INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  13
rate. First, we calibrate the model to match some long-run observations of American 
economy, and a measure of the bonus-earnings ratio constructed from Japanese data. 
Then, we compute the model using the parameter values calibrated.
8
 
5.1.    Calibration 
 
We choose the American economy to carry out the calibration of the model. The 
assumption that we make is to consider that this economy is over its long-run equilibrium. 
Indeed, if we look at the values of relevant variables of the United States throughout the 
twentieth century (Madisson (1991, 1995)), it may be assumed as in a BGP. In addition, 
we use observations regarding the bonus-earnings ratio in Japan (in Fig. 1c).   
To calibrate the model, we evaluate the dynamic system over the BGP, which yields: 
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where  θ  is the long-run growth rate, and the equations of physical and human capital 
accumulation ((21) and (22), respectively) have been considered separately. From now 
on, the omission of time sub-indexes will denote stationary values over the BGP. In 
addition, Equation (20) in the long-run equilibrium becomes: 
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8 The data and codes are available upon request via e-mail to the authors. CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  14
We must also impose that any parameterisation of the model fulfils the transversality 
conditions, which requires that: 
 
. 1 ) 1 )( 1 ( − + + > n r θ                                                    ( 2 7 )  
 
We show in the Appendix that if    the existence of a BGP implies that it 
is unique. Furthermore, it can be proved by means of a continuous time version of the 
model that the BGP is locally saddle-path stable.
, 0 0 > − H δ γ
9
The calibration process classifies the parameter into two groups. Those in the first 
group are taken directly from Cooley and Prescott (1995), and refer to the population 
growth rate,  , 012 . 0 = n   and physical capital share in good technology,  , 4 . 0 = α  of  the 
American economy. The rest of parameters  ) , , , , , , ( 1 0 σ β η δ γ γ δ H K  are calibrated to 
match some long-run observations of the American economy, and a measure of the 
bonus-earnings ratio that we construct from Japanese data (calibration targets). 
The targets and sources are as follows. We choose three measures of long-run variables 
constructed by Cooley and Prescott (1995): long-run growth rate,  , 0156 . 0 = θ  
capital-output ratio,   and consumption-output ratio,  . Note 
that these observations and Equation (21) allow obtaining physical capital depreciation 
rate,   The calibration strategy implies that consumption-physical capital 
ratio,   physical capital-labour ratio, 
, 32 . 3 / = t t Y K 7518 . 0 / = t t Y C
. 04697 . 0 = K δ
. 2482 . 0 = SR , 3886 . 7 = Z  net marginal productivity 
of physical capital,    and saving rate  %, 35 . 7
1 = − =
−
K Z NMPK δ α
α 2482 . 0 = SR  can  be 
obtained independently from human capital, preference parameters and firm’s bargaining 
power. 
The fourth target is based on the average ratio of annual special earnings to annual 
total cash earnings in Japan during the period 1965-2003 (21.3%).
10 Since the Japanese 
economy was not over its BGP during that period, we use the average ratio as an 
approximation. Special earnings include mainly bonuses and also special allowances. As 
reported by Hashimoto (1979), bonus payments predominate and constitute the most 
systematic component of special earnings. Here, we choose a compromise value of 20% 
for this ratio    %). 20 ( = BE
We would need three additional targets to calibrate the seven parameters. To solve 
this problem, we use the estimates of the speed of convergence as a target. Plenty of 
empirical studies find that the rate at which economies approach their long-run 
equilibrium ranges between 2 and 3 percent per year. Thus, we calibrate the parameters 
 
9 To prove local stability we follow the same strategy as Greiner (2003). The proof is available upon request 
via e-mail to the authors. 
10 The bonus-earnings ratio has been computed as the mean of the ratio of annual special earnings to annual 
total cash earnings during the period 1965-2003, in establishments with 10 or more regular workers. For more 
details on the data, see http://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/zuhyou/19-34.xls. INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  15
for them to deliver an asymptotic speed of convergence as close as possible to that range 
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Table 2.    Calibration Targets, Parameter Values and Long-Run Equilibrium 
Calibration Targets 





a BE Y C Y K = = = = θ  
f e d
H
c SC ) 1 , 0 ( ; ] 10 , 9 . 0 [ ; ] 09 . 0 , 0 [ ; ] 3 , 2 [ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ β σ δ
 
Parameter Values 
Population growth rate 
a n 012 . 0 =
Output technology 
04697 . 0 ; 4 . 0 = = K
a δ α  
Firm’s bargaining power   
5825 . 0 = η  
Human capital technology 
0 ; 01884 . 0 ; 01738 . 0 1 0 = = = H δ γ γ  
Preferences 
8791 . 5 ; 9999 . 0 = = σ β  
Long-run Equilibrium
Variables in the dynamic system 
1038 . 0 ; 2264 . 0 ; 3886 . 7 = = = G X Z  
Interest rate and net marginal productivity of capital (%) 
351 . 7 ; 5384 . 9 = = NMPK r  
Saving rate (%) 
82 . 24 = SR  
Asymptotic speed of convergence (%) 
0908 . 4 = SC  
Sources: 
a) Cooley and Prescott (1995); 
b) compromise value based on own elaboration from Historical 
Statistics of Japan; 
c) Barro and Sala (1995); 
d) Jones, et al. (2000); 
e) Auerbach, et al. (1983); 
f) compromise 
range based on quantitative studies. 
 
 
We also impose certain conditions on the parameter values to ensure that they are 
empirically plausible. As reported in Jones, et al. (2000), the estimates of human capital 
depreciation rate range from 0 to 0.09. Auerbach, et al. (1983) survey the estimates of 
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and find that it ranges from 0.1 to lightly 
above 1. Therefore, σ  may take values between lightly below 1 and 10. Lastly, 
looking at quantitative works (e.g., Christiano (1989); Cooley and Prescott (1995)) it 
seems reasonable to consider values for  β  below  one. CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  16
Table 2 contains a summary of calibration targets, parameter values calibrated and 
the long-run equilibrium. 
Some results in the table deserve some comments. The calibration delivers a firm’s 
bargaining power of 58.3%, which means that the worker receives the 41.75% of total 
returns to investment in specific human capital. Human capital depreciation corresponds 
to the lower bound of the considered range. Preference parameters take quite high values. 
More specifically, the implied elasticity of intertemporal substitution is 0.17 and  β  is 
almost one. 
All targets are replicated, with the exception of the asymptotic convergence rate. The 
lowest rate delivered by the model is about 4%. Nevertheless, we consider that this 
result is satisfactory, since the convergence speed achieved by two-sector models of 
endogenous growth, including those with external LBD, is around 20% (Ortigueira and 
Santos (1997)). 
Lastly, interest rate is about 2% higher than net marginal productivity of physical 
capital. As it is clear from (25), the explanation for this result comes from the double 
return to savings. Moreover, since the calibration implies that   the depreciation 
of physical capital in (25) is multiplied by less than one. 
, 0 = H δ
 
5.2.  Transitional  Dynamics 
 
In this subsection, we expose and comment the results from the computation of the 
model using the parameter values in Table 2.
11 We assume an initial ratio of physical to 
human capital lower than the one over the BGP, to be consistent with the fact that 
economies in Table 1 lost a big amount of physical capital during the war period. The 
Figures 2 and 3 display time paths for significant variables. 
Figure 2 shows the time paths for two variables in the dynamic system and the 
bonus-earnings ratio. The ratio of physical to human capital increases during the 
transitional period. Accordingly, the ratio of physical capital to specific human capital 
shadow value declines. The underlying source of these results is in the initial imbalance 
of capitals. Under LBD, the productions of physical and human capital do not compete 
for resources. On the contrary, current investment leads to higher physical and human 
capital in the next period. Thus, resources allocation is not what matters for explaining 






11 The transitional paths have been computed using the weighted residuals method. See McGrattan (1998) for 
a detailed description of this method. INTERNAL LEARNING BY DOING AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  17












































Notes: GRet: growth rate of specific human capital; GRht: growth rate of general human capital. 
 




The behaviour of the bonus-earnings ratio depends on the dynamics of   
(Equation (20)). Since specific human capital is nil at the initial period, it starts growing 
at a high rate, which declines as   accumulates. The production of general human 
capital positively depends on specific skills and, thus, its growth rate increases as   
raises. Consequently, the growth rate of specific skills is always above the one of 
general skills and, hence,   and    rise along the transition. The time evolution of 
the latter variable agrees with the one in Figure 1c, except for the observed fall from 
1997. Nevertheless, the decrease in the data may be interpreted as temporary 
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Notes: NMPKt: net marginal productivity of physical capital; rt: interest rate; GRKt: growth rate of physical 
capita; GRHt: growth rate of human capital; SRt: saving rate; GRYt: growth rate of output. Capitals and 
output are expressed in per capita terms. 
 
Figure 3.    Transitional Dynamics: Interest Rate, Saving Rate and Growth Rates of 
Capitals and Output 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the time path of the return to investment (saving), saving rate and 
growth rates of capitals and output. According to our theoretical analysis, the time path 
of interest rate is always above the one of net marginal productivity of physical capital 
  If the learning process were an external effect, the return to saving would be 
equal to  . Internal LBD, however, implies that saving has a double return: the 
usual return for increasing physical capital, and a second for producing specific skills. 
). ( t NMPK
t NMPK
The second component of interest rate acts reducing diminishing returns to physical 
capital. Indeed, as physical capital accumulates, rises in labour productivity compensates 
the fall of marginal productivity of physical capital, and makes interest rate time path 
flatter than   one. This is the reason why the model exhibits slow convergence 
to the BGP. As shown by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, p. 81-82) diminishing returns 
play an important role in determining the length of the transitional period. More 
concretely, they find that the capital share has to reach implausibly large values (in the 
neighbourhood of 0.7) for the Ramsey model to deliver a convergence rate of 4%. Our 
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model, instead, is able to slow convergence with an empirically reasonable value of 
capital share. 
The behaviour of the saving rate in the model involves a substitution effect and an 
income effect that generate incentives to reduce and increase, respectively, the saving 
rate through time. The first one is related to diminishing returns to physical capital. As 
capital rises, interest rate and, thus, the incentives to save decline. The second effect has 
to do with the gap between current and permanent income. Initially, the current income 
is far below the permanent or long-term income. The preference for smoothing 
consumption implies that households would like to devote a big (small) part of income 
to consumption (saving) when they are poor. As capital accumulates, the gap reduces 
and saving tends to rise in relation to income. From Figure 3 it follows that in our 
calibrated model the second effect imposes to the first one. This result comes from the 
fact that internal LBD acts reducing diminishing returns to physical capital accumulation 
and, hence, weakening the substitution effect. 
As we commented before, the initial imbalance between capitals leads to a higher 
growth rate for physical   than for human capital  . Additionally, 
physical capital grows at a decreasing rate along the transition as a consequence of 
diminishing returns. However, the time path of   is positively sloped and also 
flatter than the one of  . The explanation for this behaviour relies on the 
productivity of investment in the accumulation of both types of capital. An additional 
unit of investment produces one unit of physical capital and 
) ( t GRK ) ( t GRK
t GRH
t GRK
1 < γ  units of human 
capital. Thus, the ratio of investment to physical capital decreases through time, whereas 
investment relative to total human capital barely rises. 
The time evolution of the growth rate of per capita output immediately follows from 
the latter considerations. The fall of the growth rate during the transition is due to 
diminishing returns to physical capital accumulation. 
 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
Traditionally, the literature on economic growth has treated the LBD process 
proposed by Arrow (1962) as an externality. However, the empirical evidence shows 
that LBD is an intentional, and quantitatively relevant, investment in firm-specific 
human capital. Since internal LBD reduces the diminishing returns to physical capital 
accumulation, it has important implications for growth during the transitional period. 
In this paper we have analysed those implications by developing a simple model of 
endogenous growth with human capital accumulation through internal and external 
learning processes. The main feature of the model is that physical investment plays a 
double role, which results in the return to saving being higher, and its time path flatter, 
than the net marginal productivity of physical capital. As a consequence, the 
convergence speed of the economy towards its long-run equilibrium considerably slows. CARMEN ÁLVAREZ ALBELO AND ANTONIO MANRESA  20
Additionally, saving rate (investment share of output) increases along the transitional 
period, while the growth rate of per capita output falls, which agrees with observed facts 
of some economies, and especially of the Japanese economy. 
We can then conclude that the introduction of internal LBD extremely alters the 
predictions of the model, making them closer to real observations. In light of these 
findings, understanding the implications of internal LBD for economic growth seems a 
promising research line. In particular, explicitly modelling how the parties achieve an 
agreement to share investment returns, and the exploration with more general human 





To prove existence and uniqueness of the BGP, we proceed as Greiner (2003). We 




H 1 +  over the BGP, and inserting the former equation in 
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From (5), (12) and (13) it follows that: 
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  over the BGP, we 
can write the latter ratio in (29) as: 
 










































≡ Ω  with   and   constants. Finally, inserting (30) in (29) 














 we find that the BGP exists if the following 
auxiliary function has at least a solution: 
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Note that  ( ) ⋅ ,
~




1 ∞ ∪ ∈
− − γ γ Z  However, Z  
must be lower than   in order for the long-run growth rate to be positive, since we 
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